Confidential
Portions Omitted
January 7, 2008
Securities and Exchange Commission
Division of Corporate Finance
Mail Stop 3561
Washington, D.C. 20549
Attention: Ellie Quarles
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Re:
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Columbia Sportswear Company Definitive 14A |
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Filed April 20, 2007 |
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File No. 0-23939 |
Dear Ms. Quarles:
This letter is in response to your letter dated December 6, 2007 commenting on Columbia
Sportswear Companys 2007 Proxy Statement. In this letter, we have recited the Staffs comments in
italicized, bold type and have followed each comment with our response.
1. Compensation Process, page 10
We note your response to comment 6 in our letter dated August 21, 2007 and we reissue that
comment. Please confirm that you will identify the components of the modified survey
group.
We do not benchmark against specific companies or a specific peer group of companies. We
use data from multiple compensation survey sources. Data used in these surveys is
submitted confidentially by participating companies. Each survey provides a comprehensive
list of all the companies that participated in the survey, but for each job match,
compensation information is reported statistically without identifying company participants
by name.
As an example, our compensation consultant may refer to multiple compensation survey
sources, which gather data from hundreds of companies on a confidential basis. Our
consultant may use a variety of parameters (e.g., company revenues, and job description
matches) to gather compensation information from a subset of the larger survey groups. The
companies included in that subset are not identified by name. Although it may be possible
to identify the hundreds of companies that participate in the multiple surveys consulted,
that list would be extensive and would include companies that do not belong to any subset
that is used to assist in setting compensation for our executives. Accordingly, we believe
identification of the names of these companies is not material, and would be potentially
misleading, to investors. In future filings, however, we will describe in more
detail the multiple compensation survey sources and our compensation consultants use of
compensation information derived from these sources.
2. Weighting of Elements, page 11
We note your response to comment 8 in our letter dated August 21, 2007. Please expand your
analysis to identify specifically how competitors will use financial metrics to reverse
engineer or otherwise obtain information that will cause you competitive harm. We note
the examples you have provided, but you should provide a more detailed analysis of how
competitors will use this information to cause you competitive harm.
As described in our earlier response, we believe that disclosing specific financial goals
for incentive cash compensation and performance-based RSUs would cause us competitive harm.
We have expanded our analysis in Exhibit A, which is provided to the Commission on a
supplemental basis.
3. Weighting of Elements, page 11
We note your response to comment 9 in our letter dated August 21, 2007 and we reissue that
comment.
In future filings we will revise the presentation of information included in our 2007 Proxy
Statement in an effort to make the information more accessible to the reader, including
adding tabular disclosures where useful and appropriate.
We also will provide further analysis about how we determine executive compensation and
expand our discussion to provide additional information about how various factors may be
applied in setting compensation for executive officers.
Thank you for your attention. If you have any questions regarding this, please feel free to
call me directly at 503-985-4305.
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Sincerely,
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/s/ Peter J. Bragdon
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Peter J. Bragdon |
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Vice President and General Counsel |
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Page 2
of 2
EXHIBIT A
Supplemental Analysis Regarding Rationale for Nondisclosure of Performance Target Levels
The following information is provided, on a supplemental basis, in response to comment 2.
We intend that the following be read in conjunction with our prior response.
Overview
As discussed in our prior response, our incentive plans currently consist primarily of the
following:
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Three-year performance-based restricted stock units (RSUs),
with the vesting based on a matrix of cumulative operating income and return
on invested capital; and |
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Annual cash bonuses historically based on subtracting income
taxes and discretionary bonus payouts from a net income goal (goals which are
linked, in a given year, to the first year of a three-year performance period
to which the RSUs are tied). |
We believe disclosure of our targets would indicate to our competitors:
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Our general performance expectations; |
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Our anticipated achievement of strategic initiatives; and |
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Management choices and options in a given year to emphasize either
investment or income generation. |
These indicators could (1) enable competitors to make strategic decisions that negatively
affect our company, and (2) facilitate efforts by our competitors to solicit our employees
for employment.
Examples of Competitive Harm
Our current anticipated performance and recent strategic initiatives help to illustrate the
ways in which disclosure of specific performance targets would cause us competitive harm.
As of this
writing, [***]* our [***]* strategic plan
for [***]* and our 2007 annual plan (which, as noted previously, is tied to our
[***]* plan). Our Board is also preparing to approve targets for the upcoming year and
the upcoming [***]* period.
In our public disclosures in the last two
months, we have announced in general terms
significant strategic initiatives that are expected to affect [***]* in the [***]* period.
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CONFIDENTIAL PORTION OMITTED AND FILED SEPARATELY WITH
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION. |
Page 1
of Exhibit A
Specifically,
our [***]* and planned [***]* are [***]*
that affect our [***]*. Although these [***]*
are made with the intention of creating [***]*, in the short-term these
[***]* have [***]*.
These strategic initiatives are designed to
enable us to better compete against others in
our industry that in recent years have [***]*. We believe that these initiatives are considered significant by our
competitors. With these significant [***]* initiatives we naturally
seek to maintain flexibility in our plans and to maintain the maximum degree of
confidentiality. Disclosure of specific financial targets (or deviation from specific
targets) for the [***]* period and subsequent [***]* plans
as updated annually would provide competitors with insight into these [***]*, such
as (1) the anticipated scope and performance of the [***]*, (2) the [***]*, or
(3) other [***]* that might be needed by the company in
order to [***]*.
This competitive harm may be most easily
demonstrated by considering our [***]*, which is [***]* and has been disclosed to the public
only in general terms. The financial benefits of [***]*, are very
difficult to predict. The [***]*, however, has a significant impact on [***]*
that can affect [***]* as well as our [***]* (and
therefore other [***]*). Our competitors do not know
the extent of our [***]*; disclosure of [***]*, however, could provide
insight into the expected [***]* or expected [***]*. Disclosure of [***]* also
could lead our competitors to conclusions about [***]* our
management has to make decisions about [***]* and [***]*. That in turn could affect our competitors own
[***]* decisions.
Our [***]* is perhaps
an even more competitively sensitive subject
areaone that involves [***]* that is [***]* and [***]* our
[***]* business. Our [***]* initiative also involves [***]* in
[***]* and [***]*, based on a financial model that
[***]* and likely [***]*.
Unlike traditional [***]*, where [***]* performance is routinely
[***]* and [***]*, our [***]* is [***]* to our overall business and our
announcements about [***]* have been
[***]*. However, our anticipated [***]* and [***]* increasingly come into
play in our ability to achieve [***]* related to [***]*. Disclosure of
these [***]*, or [***]*
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CONFIDENTIAL PORTION OMITTED AND FILED SEPARATELY WITH
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION. |
Page 2
of Exhibit A
can send an important signal to our
competitors about the success of [***]* or [***]*. These signals may affect not
only how our competitors approach their own [***]* operations, but also how we are treated
by [***]*, who [***]*.
It also is worth noting that the emergence
of these foregoing [***]* initiatives has caused
our management to [***]*, and [***]* or [***]*
initiatives. To the extent a competitor knows our [***]* or [***]* and/or
[***]* over the long or short-term, and is able to use that knowledge to make
judgments about our [***]* or [***]* initiatives (or, alternatively, is able to
combine publicly available information about these [***]* initiatives with our [***]*),
that competitor will also gain insight into our expectations regarding [***]*.
For example, knowledge of our anticipated [***]*
and the parameters of our [***]* could properly lead an outsider to
conclude that our [***]*, among other things.
We also believe that disclosure of our
specific performance goals would facilitate efforts
by our competitors to solicit our best employees for employment. As discussed in our proxy
statement, we generally have not entered into employment contracts with domestic employees,
including top management. We seek to attract and retain top employees by making our
company an attractive place to work, in terms of professional challenges, environment and
compensation. A competitor with knowledge of specific performance targets for our RSUs
would have insight into the attractiveness of our long-term incentives that would better
enable that competitor to solicit our top management for employment. For example, as of
this date, a competitor would have reason to believe that [***]* are likely to
be [***]* than they had anticipated [***]*.
These [***]* and [***]* to executives until [***]*; disclosure of targets would give our competitors access to this
sensitive compensation information years before it would otherwise become publicly
available, and thus would provide them a competitive advantage they do not have today.
Finally, we reiterate our belief that,
although disclosure of our performance targets would
be important to our competitors for competitive reasons, that disclosure is not material to
an understanding of our compensation policies or practices. To this point, we note in
particular that two of our five most highly compensated executives, including the President
and Chief Executive Officer, do not receive equity awards, including the three-year
performance-based RSUs.
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CONFIDENTIAL PORTION OMITTED AND FILED SEPARATELY WITH THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION. |
Page 3
of Exhibit A